







The European Union & Fishing Subsidies











The European Union and Fishing Subsidies
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Executive Summary

The world's oceans are at risk of irreversible collapse. Most of the world's fisheries are fully exploited, or worse, overexploited and depleted. In Europe, the oceans are equally in crisis. Only a minority of commercially fished stocks have even been assessed or managed. Of the fish stocks that have been scientifically assessed in the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean, the majority are overfished. An increasing number of marine species are threatened, with some nearing extinction.

Growing demand for fish, combined with local resource depletion, has promoted a major expansion of European fleets in size and fishing range. European Union (EU) fleets are now found in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans through arrangements with third-party countries. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a widespread problem among European fleets in all oceans.

The EU fishing industry receives a significant amount of government subsidies, which have promoted the massive overcapacity of European fishing fleets. The European fishing fleet is estimated to be two to three times greater than what sustainable limits would allow.

In addition, the fisheries in many European countries are unprofitable and a poor investment for taxpayers. In 2009, fishing sector subsidies totalled EUR 3.3 billion, more than three times greater the amount in typically quoted public figures. In 13 countries, subsidies were greater than the value of the fish catch.

This paper attempts to provide as complete an overview as possible on the sources and amounts of subsidies available to the EU fishing sector for the most recent year available. The paper also provides a country-by-country analysis and evaluation of subsidy intensity as an indicator of economic performance.

More detailed information is available at www.oceana.org/eusubsidies, including explanations for all figures, the sources of information, the legal foundation of the subsidy and, if applicable, the method of calculation.



The World's Fisheries

The world relies on the oceans for food and livelihood. More than one billion people depend on fish as a key source of protein.¹ Fishing activities support coastal communities and hundreds of millions of people who rely on fishing for all or part of their income.²

According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 85 percent of the world's fisheries are now overexploited, fully exploited, significantly depleted or recovering from overexploitation.³

In 2005, the FAO stated: "The maximum long-term potential of the world marine capture fisheries has been reached." As a result, increased demand for wild-capture fish cannot be met by increasing fishing effort without restoring fish populations and ensuring their ongoing sustainability. Sustainable fishing can only be achieved through compliance with effective fisheries management programs, by controlling illegal fishing and by limiting subsidies that not only distort trade, but undermine management efforts and lead to overfishing.

In Europe, 63 percent of the assessed fish stocks in the Atlantic and 82 percent in the Mediterranean are overfished.⁵ A recent impact assessment by the European Commission concluded that if the status quo is maintained and fishing continues at current rates, only nine percent of European fish stocks will be managed at sustainable levels by 2022,⁶ despite the commitment by countries to manage all fisheries sustainably by 2015.⁷

Fisheries management in Europe is poor to non-existent. In 2009, 82 percent of the species commercially fished by European fleets were not managed by fishing quotas.⁸ However, stocks of managed species are not doing much better, in large part because of the failure of EU member states to follow scientific advice. For example, in 2010, the European Council of Ministers, comprised of fishery ministers from EU member states, set catch allowances for Atlantic fish stocks 20 percent higher than the level recommended by scientists.⁹

EU fisheries management also violates international law. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), Article 61(3),¹⁰ requires that fisheries management measures by coastal states in the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) must aim at restoring and maintaining fish stock biomass that can produce maximum sustainable yields. The maximum sustainable yield is theoretically defined as the largest yield (or catch) that can be taken over an indefinite period, without harming the fish stock. Yet only 13 percent of European stocks in the Atlantic and 18 percent of those in the Mediterranean are at or near this internationally agreed reference point.¹¹

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

IUU fishing is a serious global problem and one of the main impediments to the achievement of sustainable fisheries. IUU fishing represents a major loss of revenue, particularly for some of the poorest countries in the world where dependency on fisheries for food, livelihood and revenue is high.

IUU marine catch is estimated to be between 11 and 26 million tonnes per year, worth between USD \$10 and \$23 billion or EUR 7.3 and 17 billion. In some cases, fisheries experts report that IUU fishing accounts for up to 40 percent of the total yearly catch.¹²

IUU fishing includes three principal types of activities:¹³

- Illegal fishing, where vessels operate in violation of fisheries laws or regulations.
- Unreported fishing that has not been reported or has been misreported to the relevant national authority or
 regional fisheries management organization, in contravention of applicable laws, regulations or reporting procedures.
- **Unregulated fishing** by vessels without nationality; fishing by vessels flying the flag of a country not party to the regional fisheries management organization governing that fishing area or species; or fishing of unmanaged stocks or in unmanaged areas in a manner that is inconsistent with state responsibilities under international law.

By nature, IUU fishing is an unsustainable practice that makes it impossible to effectively manage fisheries. It respects neither national boundaries nor international attempts to manage high-seas resources, putting unsuitable pressure on fish stocks, marine wildlife and habitats, subverting labor standards and distorting markets.

Fishing, Jobs and Trade

According to the FAO, EU countries comprise the third largest global fishing nation behind China and Peru.

In 2009, EU countries caught more than five million tonnes of fish: four million tonnes from Northeast Atlantic and EU waters, and one million tonnes from the rest of the world's oceans.¹⁴

According to European Commission data, more than 140,000 people are employed as fishers in the EU. However, employment in the fishing sector in Europe is concentrated within a handful of countries. Spain alone accounts for 25 percent of employment, and Spain, Greece and Italy account for 60 percent.¹⁵


The EU is the world's largest importer and exporter of fish by volume. In 2008, the EU was the third largest importer behind Japan and the United States, and the second largest exporter behind China, by value. Imports of fish products amounted to more than 10 million tonnes, worth more than USD \$45 billion or EUR 33 billion. Exports that same year were seven million tonnes, worth more than USD \$26 billion or EUR 19 billion.¹⁶

The European Fishing Empire

Growing demand for fish, combined with local resource depletion, has promoted the major expansion of European fleets in size and fishing range.

More than 700 EU-flagged fishing vessels catch more than one million tonnes of fish outside of EU waters. Most of this activity occurs under "Fisheries Partnership Agreements" (FPAs), mainly with developing countries in East and West Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, while some occurs under the Northern agreements with Norway, Iceland and the Faeroes.¹⁷ Under the FPAs, the EU pays countries for access to their fishing resources. In addition, EU vessels also fish in the international waters of the West and South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans.

Due to its scope and high volume of catch, the EU fishing fleet has a large impact on fish stocks in non-European waters. This is particularly significant in developing countries, where the local communities depend on the coastal fish stocks for food and livelihood.



European Fishing Empire

EU Fish Catch in 2009



Fishing and Subsidies

Fishing subsidies are defined as direct or indirect financial transfers of funds from public entities that help make the fishing sector more profitable than it would be otherwise. Fishing subsidies can create incentives to fish more, even when catches are declining.¹⁸ The results are overfishing, fleet overcapitalization, reduced economic efficiency and failure to realize the potential economic benefits from the resource.¹⁹

The World Bank also concluded that subsidies create enormous economic losses and impacts on the global fishing industry. A World Bank report found that input subsidies tend to reinforce the sector's "poverty trap" by creating incentives for greater investment and fishing effort in overstressed fisheries. The same report stressed that the economic losses in global fisheries resulting from inefficiencies (including subsidies) and overfishing amounts up to USD \$50 billion a year.²⁰

Beneficial, Capacity-Enhancing and Ambiguous Fishing Subsidies²¹

Fishing subsidies can generally be divided into three categories: beneficial, capacity-enhancing and ambiguous.

Beneficial subsidies enhance the growth of fish stocks through conservation, monitoring and control of catch rates. Beneficial subsidies include programs such as fisheries management, research and Marine Protected Areas.

Capacity-enhancing subsidies stimulate overcapacity and overfishing through artificially increased profits that further stimulate effort and compound resource overexploitation problems. These include programs such as fuel subsidies, boat construction and modernization, fishing port construction and renovation, price and marketing support, processing and storage infrastructure, fishery development projects, tax exemptions and foreign access agreements.

Ambiguous subsidies can lead to positive or negative impacts on the fishery resource depending on the design of the program. Some examples include fisher assistance programs, decommissioning and buyback programs and community development programs.

Subsidies and the European Fishing Sector

Despite the precarious condition of fisheries in Europe and beyond, the EU continues to provide massive subsidies to support its fishing fleets. Europe is one of the world's top three subsidizers, along with China and Japan.²² Information from the European Commission and European national ministries on fishing subsidies, if available at all, is usually partial and incomplete, which suggests that the total amount of fishing subsidies is significantly higher than the figures officially provided.²³

As a result of these major subsidies, the EU now has a fishing fleet that is estimated to be two to three times larger than what sustainable limits would allow.²⁴ Overcapacity of the EU fishing fleet remains a major problem.²⁵ Repeated attempts to tackle the issue have failed, and technological improvements have overshadowed any small capacity decreases.²⁶

In fact, many European fleets only continue to operate with the support of government subsidies. A recent economic analysis by the European Commission revealed that despite subsidies, 30 to 40 percent of the fishing segment it assessed suffered losses each year from 2002 to 2008.²⁷

In its Green Paper introducing the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform the European Commission stressed that only a few EU fleets are profitable without public support, and most of Europe's fishing fleets are either running losses or returning low profits. Researchers confirm that revenue-enhancing subsidies and those that reduce fishing costs increase participation and fishing effort. Overcapacity affects fisheries management in many ways: it leads to political demands to disregard scientific advice for reduction of catch limits, causes illegal fishing and reduces the profitability of operators. Excessive fishing activities also damage the marine environment, particularly through greater catch of non-target and protected species.

Taxpayers throughout the EU finance the subsidies given to the fishing sector. Fisheries and agriculture are the two large policy sectors that are overseen mainly by the EU, and member states finance a large European Commission budget for fisheries policies and activities.


Fishing Subsidies in 2009

Oceana performed a comprehensive, independent assessment of subsidies allocated for the European fishing industry in 2009, the latest year where information is available.

Oceana's analysis found that a total of at least EUR 3.3 billion in subsidies were available to EU fleets in 2009. This is more than three times the publicly available figures referenced in the past, which only include European Fisheries Fund (EFF) data.

- More than two-thirds of these subsidies have the ability to enhance fishing capacity and promote overfishing as they can be classified as either ambiguous or capacity—enhancing subsidies.
- The EFF provided more than EUR 1 billion in subsidies.
- The support provided annually through the EFF is only one part of the subsidies that
 are available to the fishing sector. The research revealed an estimated additional EUR
 886 million in fisheries subsidies when other relevant programs and financial
 instruments are considered.
- A review and assessment of fuel tax programs revealed an estimated EUR 1.4 billion in subsidies for the fishing sector.
- Total subsidies to the fishing sector are equivalent to 50 percent of the value of the total fish catch by the EU in the same year (EUR 6.6 billion).
- Spain, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Italy received the most fishing subsidies.
- Thirteen EU countries had more fishing subsidies than the value of the landings of fish in their ports.


Top 10 Recipients of Fishing Subsidies (EUR by country)



Fisheries Subsidies in the EU Calculated for 2009 (EUR by country)

Country	EFF ³⁰	State Aid ³¹	Second Financial Instrument ³²	Agriculture Guarantee Fund ³³	Other Sources ³⁴	Fuel Subsidies and Tax Exemption ³⁵	De minimis³6	Sum
Spain	303,443,009	37,400,000	99,427,351	9,301,359	12,819	241,750,290	42,626,667	733,961,495
France	60,471,634	88,147,900	39,314,816	9,223,452	3,586,980	115,009,785	46,183,333	361,937,900
Denmark	37,414,702	16,268,223	25,751,576	963,108	20,851	207,752,367	19,216,667	307,387,494
United Kingdom	40,232,519	2,858,793	28,889,125	605,995	10,180	157,865,482	34,241,667	264,703,762
Italy	119,138,824	5,512,000	26,329,053	299,433	20,140	67,958,022	31,441,667	250,699,139
Poland	162,433,489	0	5,735,884	309,276	7,764	59,806,083	7,041,667	235,334,163
Netherlands	20,898,367	5,000,000	40,718,909	457,592	2,565	102,077,404	11,958,333	181,113,170
Germany	35,070,869	4,230,000	23,738,199	264,998	5,800	66,871,382	16,316,667	146,497,914
Portugal	45,578,197	4,000,000	18,066,163	4,489,443	9,009	53,521,306	5,229,333	130,893,451
Ireland	10,722,832	6,000,000	10,639,859	924,454	19,483	79,757,204	2,836,000	110,899,833
Sweden	14,711,796	2,000,000	11,515,467	327,176	1,910,066	54,335,485	3,717,667	88,517,657
Greece	39,375,988	3,916,629	16,192,942	160,449	1,615	22,260,045	6,005,000	87,912,668
Latvia	22,349,330	0	11,121,949	736,180	3,357	43,597,300	1,307,667	79,115,783
Lithuania	10,123,504	1,796,455	17,636,612	223,376	2,194	46,129,321	1,744,333	77,655,795
Finland	12,838,872	2,000,000	4,574,822	158,516	10,319	41,294,466	2,358,333	63,235,329
Estonia	14,519,764	1,000,000	2,893,291	808,705	7,092	26,298,671	1,239,333	46,766,856
Romania	40,208,312	0	757,003	4,122	3,484	1,073,819	174,670	42,221,409
Czech Republic	4,924,909	27,000,000	43,380	4,216	3,130	1,098,393	336,000	33,410,029
Belgium	8,527,940	0	5,631,084	112,879	0	5,802,360	3,933,333	24,007,596
Bulgaria	15,464,181	0	1,031,955	9,206	3,599	2,398,195	144,330	19,051,466
Hungary	7,067,231	0	65,410	6,528	6,996	1,700,480	246,667	9,093,311
Cyprus	5,520,716	0	483,760	1,441	2,465	375,302	520,667	6,904,351
Slovenia	5,228,149	0	215,690	1,064	4,950	277,083	112,667	5,839,602
Malta	1,808,608	0	2,849,462	1,635	3,571	426,055	85,000	5,174,332
Slovakia	2,530,150	190,000	18,964	1,806	2,753	470,397	377,667	3,591,736
Austria	1,476,424	0	5,648	359	3,472	93,492	206,670	1,786,065
Luxembourg ³⁷	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	1,042,080,316	207,320,000	393,648,375	29,396,768	5,664,654	1,400,000,187	239,602,005	3,317,712,306

Comparison of Subsidies with Value of Landings



■ Value of landed fish ■ Subsidies

European Fisheries Fund (EFF)

The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and the Second Financial Instrument are the main financial instruments concerned with fishing and fish processing activities in the EU.

The total budget of the EFF is EUR 4.3 billion for the period 2007 to 2013. This funding is supposed to be split evenly over the duration of the program (EUR 615 million per year). EFF funding is based on the principal of co-financing and requires member states to provide additional funds at rates that vary depending on the type of project. The total share for the member states is EUR 2.8 billion. Therefore, under the EFF framework, total funding to the fisheries sector is EUR 7.1 billion during this period.³⁸

Some major areas funded under the EFF include programs for the temporary cessation of fishing activities; vessel decommissioning; replacement of engines; fish processing; marketing and promotional campaigns; and construction of fishing ports, shelter and landing sites.

Vessel construction, modernization and the export of fishing vessels are not allowed under the EFF. However, there are a number of loopholes and exceptions, such as the construction of fishing boats in the outermost regions of the EU like the Canary Islands.³⁹ In 2007, the possibility of receiving subsidies for more efficient engines for fishing vessels was reintroduced as part of a fuel package in response to the increase in fuel prices.⁴⁰

Measures Subsidized under the European Fisheries Fund (EFF)

Areas for Subsidies under the EFF	Measures	Budget ⁴¹
Adjustment of the fleet	 Decommissioning of fishing vessels Temporary cessation of vessel activity Upgrades for safety, working conditions, hygiene, energy efficiency and/or gear selectivity Small-scale coastal fishing Early retirement and retraining Replacement of engines 	28.14%
Aquaculture, processing and marketing, inland fishing	AquacultureInland fishingProcessing and marketing of fish	28.78%
Measures of common interest	 Protection and development of aquatic fauna and flora, and artificial reefs Protection and enhancement of the environment in NATURA 2000 areas Fishing ports, shelters and landing sites Development of new markets Marketing and promotion campaigns Pilot projects including tests of new technologies and management measures 	26.21%
Sustainable development of fisheries areas	 Aid for coastal communities with high employment in fisheries Fish processing Tourism Interregional and transnational cooperation 	13.18%
Technical assistance	- Studies, reports and information activities - Implementation of operational programmes	3.69%

Additional Sources of Fishing Subsidies

The Second Financial Instrument provides financing for fisheries control, data collection, the participation in international fisheries bodies and access to foreign fishing grounds (Fisheries Partnership Agreements).⁴²

The European Agriculture Guarantee Fund (EAGF)⁴³ includes different intervention mechanisms for fish products and covers the expenditure for producer organizations such as their restructuring and the implementation of their plans to improve quality.⁴⁴ The EAGF also funds fisheries programs in the outermost regions for Spain (Canary), Portugal (Azores and Madeira) and France (French Guiana and Reunion).⁴⁵

There are also several additional sources of subsidies, including state aid, *de minimis* aid, payments for access to foreign fishing grounds, fuel tax schemes, and other minor programs.

State aid are schemes initiated independently by the member states. As examples, these programs include grants, interest subsidies and tax reductions. The European Commission created guidelines on state aid to the fisheries sector to ensure compliance with objectives of the EFF. The rules allow member states to grant state aid for most of the measures included in the EFF; however, due to their specific character, aid for the replacement of engines and fishing gear, and aid for the sustainable development of fisheries areas are not included. Member states are required to notify the EU about state aid programs, unless an exemption already applies (e.g., for a *de minimis* rule or block exemption).⁴⁶

De minimis aid is national aid that is not considered to distort competition. The *de minimis* regulation for the fisheries sector (adopted in 2007) states that a limited amount of state aid can be given to fishing companies: EUR 30,000 per company over a period of three fiscal years, if the total amount of funding given by a member state to its fishing industry does not exceed 2.5 percent of the total production value of the fisheries sector.⁴⁷

The total amount that member states can spend under the *de minimis* rule is currently capped at EUR 719 million for three years (EUR 240 million per year). *De minimis* aid is frequently used for direct fuel subsidies, as *de minimis* regulation was introduced to mitigate the consequences of rapidly rising energy prices.⁴⁸ In May 2011, the European Parliament made an attempt to increase the level of *de minimis* subsidies from EUR 30,000 to EUR 60,000 per firm.⁴⁹ So far, the European Commission has refused to accede to this request.

Agreements for access to foreign fishing grounds and fuel tax programs are extensive and considerable. These are discussed in more detail in the next section of the report.

De Minimis Ceilings per EU Member State (2009)50

Country	EUR	Country	EUR	Country	EUR	
Austria	206,667	Germany	16,316,667	Netherlands	11,958,333	
Belgium	3,933,333	Greece	6,005,000	Poland	7,041,667	
Bulgaria	144,333	Hungary	246,667	Portugal	5,229,333	
Cyprus	520,667	Ireland	2,836,000	Romania	174,667	
Czech Republic	336,000	Italy	31,441,667	Slovakia	377,667	
Denmark	19,216,667	Latvia	1,307,667	Slovenia	112,667	
Estonia	1,239,333	Lithuania	1,744,333	Spain	42,626,667	
Finland	2,358,333	Luxembourg	0	Sweden	3,717,667	
France	46,183,333	Malta	85,000	United Kingdom	34,241,667	

Fuel Subsidies

A study from 2006 showed that fuel subsidies, in the form of direct payments for fuel to fishing companies, were paid in France, Greece, Poland, Spain and Sweden.⁵¹ In comparison, in 2009, direct fuel subsidies were largely paid under the scheme of *de minimis* aid and are included in that category of figures in this report.

In the EU, fuel used by fishing vessels is also exempt from taxes. Oceana's analysis and calculations found that in 2009 there were additional subsidies for the fishing sector as a result of fuel tax exemptions worth at least EUR 1.4 billion.⁵² The EU Joint Research Centre estimated the fuel consumption of the EU's fishing fleet to be 3.7 billion liters in 2008.⁵³ Combining country-specific tax levels with catch figures provided by the European Commission allows the calculation of a EU weighted-average tax level for marine gasoil of EUR 0.39 for 2009.⁵⁴

Fuel subsidies not only support overfishing by directly reducing the costs for the fishing operation, but cheaper fuel makes it possible to fish further and longer. Fuel subsidies are also a large driver of overcapacity of EU vessels, as they undermine the workings of the market of supply and demand and negate the expected conservation value in fuel prices. The European Commission emphasizes that one of the most important subsidies for EU vessels is the overall exemption from fuel taxes. 56

The real degree of economic loss in the fishing sector is revealed when EU fishing subsidies per country are compared with the actual value of fish landings in the country.

Subsidies to the fishing sector, not including fuel tax exemptions, exceed the value of the total fish catch in 12 EU countries. Four of these countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) do not have fishing ports and therefore no income from fish landings. However, these countries still receive fishing subsidies, mostly for aquaculture or inland fishing. Several of the countries are "convergence-countries" that receive more subsidies because they recently joined the EU (including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Romania).⁵⁷ However, Finland also had more fishing subsidies than the value of landings in its ports.⁵⁸

When the additional benefits from fuel tax programs are considered, 13 countries had access to more subsidies than the value of their landed catches. Besides countries without fishing ports and convergence countries, these include Finland, Germany and Sweden. The findings in these cases are particularly noteworthy. In Finland, subsidies were more than three times higher than the value of the landed catch and more than 1.5 times in Germany. Sweden is paying roughly the same amount in fishing subsidies as the value of its fish landings.

Economic Performance of the European Fishing Sector 2009 (Alphabetical by country)

Country	Total Subsidies (€) without fuel	Total Subsidies with fuel (€)	Value of Fish Landings (€) ⁵⁹	Subsidies intensity ⁶⁰ (%) with fuel	Subsidies intensity (%) without fuel
Austria	1,692,573	1,786,065	0	0	0
Belgium	18,205,236	24,007,596	59,599,396	40.28%	30.55%
Bulgaria	16,653,271	19,051,466	3,129,924	608.69%	532.07%
Cyprus	6,529,049	6,904,351	8,576,587	80.50%	76.13%
Czech Republic	32,311,635	33,410,029	0	0	0
Denmark	99,635,127	307,387,494	360,444,111	85.28%	27.64%
Estonia	20,468,186	46,766,856	18,221,804	256.65%	112.33%
Finland	21,940,862	63,235,329	18,042,550	350.48%	121.61%
France	246,928,115	361,937,900	785,280,905	46.09%	31.44%
Germany	79,626,533	146,497,914	90,247,787	162.33%	88.23%
Greece	65,652,624	87,912,668	458,778,533	19.16%	14.31%
Hungary	7,392,831	9,093,311	0	0	0
Ireland	31,142,629	110,899,833	236,000,398	46.99%	13.20%
Italy	182,741,117	250,699,139	1,209,970,517	20.72%	15.10%
Latvia	35,518,483	79,115,783	13,556,326	583.61%	262.01%
Lithuania	31,526,474	77,655,795	6,660,979	1165.83%	473.30%
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	4,748,277	5,174,332	8,783,058	58.91%	54.06%
Netherlands	79,035,766	181,113,170	512,000,000	35.37%	15.44%
Poland	175,528,080	235,334,163	37,955,546	620.03%	462.46%
Portugal	77,372,145	130,893,451	223,782,417	58.49%	34.57%
Romania	41,147,591	42,221,409	594,814	7098.25%	6917.72%
Slovakia	3,121,340	3,591,736	0	0	0
Slovenia	5,562,520	5,839,602	1,687,015	346.15%	329.73%
Spain	492,211,205	733,961,495	1,793,180,677	40.93%	27.45%
Sweden	34,182,172	88,517,657	90,314,358	98.01%	37.85%
United Kingdom	106,838,280	264,703,762	659,744,018	40.12%	16.19%
Total	1,917,712,119	3,317,712,306	6,596,551,720	50.29%	29.07%

Fisheries Partnership Agreements

The EU has two types of fishing agreements with non-EU countries: 1) Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) with developing countries near African, Caribbean and Pacific oceans where the EU provides financial and technical support in exchange for fishing rights; and 2) northern agreements concerning the joint management of shared stocks with Norway, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.

The costs of FPAs are largely funded by the EU and provide substantial benefits for the EU and its fishing industry while disadvantaging many of the affected developing countries. In 2009, close to EUR 150 million was paid to 14 countries to secure access to fisheries for European fleets.⁶¹

The volume of catches under FPAs is around 400,000 tonnes per year, valued at EUR 430 million. Small pelagic catches made under the agreements (around 240,000 tonnes) are not supplied to the EU market, but rather to West African countries. The volume of supply to the EU market from the FPAs is estimated at a minimum of 160,000 tonnes, valued at EUR 320 million per year. One of the most profitable agreements, between the EU and Kiribati, generated EUR 20.2 for every Euro paid.⁶²

EU financial contributions under FPAs are a significant (and often the main) source of revenue for national fishery ministries and authorities. In some developing countries, EU payments are also a significant share of the overall public revenues. For example, in Mauritania, the total EU contributions were 15 times the national budget for fisheries and accounted for more than 16 percent of the country's total public revenues. The EU contribution is comparable in Guinea Bissau (15.6 percent).

An important stated intent of FPAs is to improve fisheries sustainability and adherence to the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries through binding conditions for policy and management. However, a recent review of FPAs concluded that these goals have not been met, and there is little evidence that funding from these agreements has made any direct or substantial difference to the development of policies and plans for sustainable management.⁶³

EU Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs)

Country	Fishing opportunities	Reference tonnage	Total EU Contribution (2009)
Cape-Verde	Tuna: 25 seiners, 48 surface longliners, 11 pole-and-line tuna vessels	5,000 tonnes	EUR 385,000
Comoros	Tuna: 40 seiners, 17 surface longliners	6,000 tonnes	EUR 390,000
Ivory Coast	Tuna: 25 seiners, 15 surface longliners	7,000 tonnes	EUR 595,000
Gabon	Tuna: 24 seiners, 16 surface longliners	11,000 tonnes	EUR 860,000
Greenland	Cod: 3 500 t, redfish: 8 000 t, Greenland halibut: 10 000 t, shrimp: 11 000 t, Atlantic halibut: 1 400 t, capelin: 55 000 t, snowcrab: 500 t, by-catches: 2 300 t	23,623 tonnes	EUR 15,874,244
Guinea-Bissau	4 400 grt for shrimps and 4 400 grt for fish and cephalopods; tuna: 23 seiners, 14 pole-and-line vessels	N/A	EUR 7,500,000
Kiribati	Tuna: 4 seiners, 12 longliners	6,400 tonnes	EUR 478,400
Madagascar	Tuna: 43 seiners, 50 longliners (> 100 GT), 26 longliners (< 100 GT), 5 demersal	13,300 tonnes	EUR 1,197,000
Mauritania	Tuna: 22 seiners, 22 surface longliners and pole-and-liners; various crustaceans and demersal species	N/A	EUR 76,000,000
Morocco	20 small-scale pelagic seiners North, 30 small-scale longliners North, 20 small-scale fishing south, 22 demersal fishing, 27 tuna pole-and-liners, 60 000 tonnes small pelagics (max 18 vessels)	N/A	EUR 36,100,000
Mozambique	Tuna: 44 purse seiners, 45 longliners	10,000 tonnes	EUR 900,000
Solomon Islands	Tuna: 4 seiners, 10 longliners	6,000 tonnes	EUR 400,000
Sao Tomé e Principe	Tuna: 25 seiners, 18 longliners	8,500 tonnes	EUR 663,000
Seychelles	Tuna: 40 seiners, 12 longliners	63,000 tonnes	EUR 5,355,000

Methodology

The information contained in this paper was obtained from publications from the EU and its member states. In most cases, amounts were calculated based on available figures. Estimates were also made to show distribution of fishing subsidies among EU member states. The figures presented for the European Fisheries Fund represent amounts decided to be spent in 2009. In some cases, the actual amounts distributed were lower than the decided amount.

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63 Idem.

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